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THE CLASSIC 25% RULE AND THE ART OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 
ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER1 
ABSTRACT 
Fifty years ago, Robert Goldscheider helped pioneer the use 
of a methodology known as “the 25% Rule,” a tool for 
determining reasonable royalties in intellectual property 
licensing negotiations. The Rule holds that licensees of 
intellectual property normally deserve the lion’s share of the 
profit because they usually bear the bulk of the business risk 
associated with bringing the intellectual property to market. 
Experts familiar with the art of intellectual property licensing 
frequently rely on the 25% Rule to rationally determine 
reasonable royalties in litigation and transactional settings.  
The Rule’s prominence has been accompanied by 
unfortunate misunderstandings about its form and substance. It 
is not, as some suggest, intended to be a simple shortcut to 
determine patent royalties. Rather, it was developed as, and 
remains, a meticulous methodology inspired by significant 
private transactions and ultimately refined by brilliant judicial 
interpretation. As such, it is inappropriate to condescendingly 
diminish it to a mere “rule of thumb.” When properly 
understood and applied, the Classic 25% Rule is an effective 
discipline that achieves the high standards of reliability 
demanded by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Daubert and Kumho 
Tire cases.  
                                                      
1 Just prior to the publication of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Uniloc v. 
Microsoft, I met Matthew Turetzky at lunch with his grandfather, a respected 
friend of mine, who had told me, with justified pride, that Matthew was the 
Editor-in-Chief of the DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW and hopes to 
specialize in the law of intellectual property. Knowing of my connection with a 
methodology known as the 25% Rule, Matthew phoned me immediately after 
the court’s opinion in the Uniloc case appeared. When he learned of my interest 
in commenting about the opinion, Matthew immediately offered his help, and 
that of a team of his colleagues on the DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, to 
assemble all of the documentation and provide any further support I might 
request. The Duke team, consisting of Matthew Turetzky, Editor-in-Chief, 
Alberto Araiza, Managing Editor; Kristen Wolff, Chief Executive Editor; and 
Gordon White, Executive Editor performed excellently, helping to produce what 
I hope will prove to be a serious contribution to this important matter. 
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On January 4, 2011, the Federal Circuit, in Uniloc v. 
Microsoft, held that “the 25 percent rule of thumb is a 
fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty 
rate in a hypothetical negotiation.”2  
This decision is problematic for a variety of reasons: (1) it 
assumes that the 25% Rule, as it is classically understood, is a 
rule of thumb; (2) district courts could interpret it as prohibiting 
damages experts from applying the Classic 25% Rule as a tool 
for determining a baseline royalty rate, because of the court’s 
confusion between a baseline royalty rate and a “reasonable 
royalty” under § 284 of the Patent Act; and (3) it could 
denigrate the skills of true experts who have utilized, and 
continue to utilize, the Classic 25% Rule in a way that otherwise 
meets the admissibility standards of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  
This article attempts to correct these misunderstandings in 
the hope of restoring some certainty in an area of jurisprudence 
that, unfortunately, has become an unpredictable area of the 
law.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 On January 4, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit published its decision in Uniloc U.S.A., Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp.,3 signed by Judge Richard Linn and resolving several issues 
related to the interpretation of Patent No. 5,490,216 (the ’216 patent).4  
The matter had been appealed from a decision by the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Rhode Island directed to validity, infringement, willful 
infringement, and damages from the infringement of the ’216 patent.5 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a 
matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement by Microsoft, affirmed the 
district court’s grant of JMOL of no willful infringement by Microsoft, 
and, “because the jury’s damages award was fundamentally tainted by 
the use of a legally inadequate methodology,” affirmed the grant of a 
                                                      
2 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
3 Id., aff’g in part, rev’g in part 640 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.R.I. 2009). This series 
of appeals, referred to by the court as Uniloc II, is referred to hereinafter simply 
as Uniloc. The previous string of appeals, referred to by the court as Uniloc I, is 
not mentioned in this article. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F. 
App’x 337 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rev’g 447 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.R.I. 2009).  
4 System for Software Registration, U.S. Patent No. 5,490,216 (filed Sept. 21, 
1993).  
5 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.R.I. 2009), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
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new trial on damages to determine Microsoft’s monetary liability based 
on its infringement of the ’216 patent.6  
¶2 This article is directed toward the damages issue. The pertinent 
language in Judge Linn’s opinion is as follows:  
This court now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25 
percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool for 
determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation. 
Evidence relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is thus 
inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the 
case at issue.7 
¶3 Judge Linn refers to me by name as the “leading proponent” of 
“the rule.”8 I appreciate this because, as will be explained infra, I have 
effectively employed the “the Classic version” of the Rule for over fifty 
years. Such use initially occurred in the marketplace, where I advised 
parties to patent licenses, and also frequently drafted technical assistance 
agreements in which patents were an element. The “Classic Rule,” the 
name I employ throughout this article, has been used by intellectual 
property (IP) licensing experts since the 1970 Georgia-Pacific decision.9 
During its lifetime, as acknowledged in Judge Linn’s opinion, some 
version of the 25% Rule has been used in literally hundreds of cases 
without recriminations by the parties.10 If the recent Federal Circuit 
decision means to challenge the Classic 25% Rule, whose demise the 
Federal Circuit claims to be demanded by Daubert’s progeny, then with 
the strike of a pen, the Federal Circuit has thrown into jeopardy hundreds 
of relationships applying the “reasonable royalty” standard of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284,11 thereby confusing those transacting in the marketplace. If the 
                                                      
6 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1295. 
7 Id. at 1315.  
8 Id. at 1312. 
9 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
10 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1314–15 (citing cases in which the Classic 25% Rule as I 
understand it, or some misunderstood variant thereof, is relevant).  
11 Damages in patent infringement cases are never “less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest 
and costs as fixed by the court.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (emphasis added). To 
determine what constitutes a reasonable royalty in a given case, the parties 
usually call professionals skilled in the art of IP negotiations to testify, as 
anticipated by 35 U.S.C. § 284. Relying on their experience with these 
transactions, the experts are expected to come up with a “reasonable royalty” 
based on their creation of a “hypothetical negotiation.” Uniloc, 632 F.3d, at 
1312 (citing Wang Labs, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 869–70 (Fed. Cir. 
1993)).  
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Federal Circuit intended for such results in Uniloc, then those involved in 
the art of IP licensing should be seriously concerned. 
¶4 I believe the Federal Circuit has been misled about the realities 
of the Classic 25% Rule, which is quite distinguishable from what the 
Federal Circuit described in Uniloc as the “25% Rule of Thumb.” 
Therefore, I hope that the substance of this article will be taken into 
account by the parties—who can still petition the United States Supreme 
Court for certiorari—as well as by the district court ordered by the 
Federal Circuit in Uniloc to conduct a new trial on damages. 
I. WHAT IS THE “25% RULE OF THUMB?” 
¶5 In order to understand the rule invalidated by Uniloc “as a matter 
of Federal Circuit law,”12 one must first understand the concept of “rule 
of thumb,” which is a flawed tool for calculating a “reasonable royalty” 
in patent infringement cases. “Rule of thumb” is not a descriptive term I 
normally employ in my work; as a matter of fact, I have criticized it.13 
¶6 In an effort to confirm the accuracy of my interpretation of the 
term “rule of thumb,” and because the court refers to it in a legal sense, I 
decided to consult my copy of Black’s Law Dictionary. There is 
considerable material of interest about the term “rule.” Two quotations 
are directly relevant:  
Rule: “to settle or decide a point of law arising upon a trial and, 
when it is said of a judge presiding at such a trial that he ‘ruled’ so-
and-so, it is meant that he laid down, settled, or decided such-and-
such to be the law.”14  
The other one reads: 
Rule: “precept attaching a definite detailed legal consequence to a 
definite detailed state of facts.”15  
¶7 There are also references to many types of rules, including rule 
absolute, rule against perpetuities, rule nisi, rule of apportionment, rule 
of force, rule of laws, rule of lenity, rule of necessity, rule of 
                                                      
12 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315 (emphasis added).  
13 I have been quite explicit on this position for over fifty years. In 1959, with 
only “some modest experience in licensing,” I argued against the logic of a “rule 
of thumb” to clients I advised because a rule of thumb “reflected a theory that all 
race horses are equal, and should be valued that way. I indicated that Citation 
and Whirlaway, two recent Triple Crown winners, were certainly worth more 
than an average thoroughbred, and that technologies should likewise be judged 
on their specific merits.” ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER, LICENSING AND THE ART OF 
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT § 11:4 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter LICENSING]. 
14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195–96 (5th ed. 1979).  
15 Id.  
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presumption, rule of reason, and rule to show cause.16 There is no 
reference, however, to “rule of thumb.”17  
¶8 I next consulted Webster’s New Universal Abridged Dictionary, 
which did have a definition of “rule of thumb.” It reads, “a rule 
suggested by practical, rather than scientific knowledge; hence any way 
of doing things that is practical, though crude.”18 I also looked at the 
Random House Dictionary, which defined rule of thumb as a “rough, 
practical method of procedure.”19 
¶9 Without looking any further, it is obvious to me, on its face, that 
the “25% Rule of Thumb” should correctly run afoul of the requirements 
of Daubert, Kumho, and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.20 
These sources are cited by Judge Linn as requiring that expert testimony 
pertain to “scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge . . . based on 
firm scientific and technical grounding.”21 Furthermore, “[e]xpert 
testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant 
and, ergo, non-helpful.”22 As I read Judge Linn’s language and the 
writings of various scholars, whose personal experiences as negotiators 
of patent and other IP licenses are not known to me, the “Rule of 
Thumb” envisaged and disapproved of by them consists simply of a 
fixed ratio of 25:75 for determining a baseline royalty, related 
respectively to the licensor and the actual or potential licensee, which 
then requires no further analysis to arrive at a “reasonable royalty.”23 
                                                      
16 Id.  
17 Id. There is also no reference to “rule of thumb” in the most recent edition. 
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
18 WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1585 (2d ed. 1979). 
19 THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 771 (1980). 
20 See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (agreeing with my conclusion here, that experts’ testimony using arbitrary 
rules of thumb as a substitute for an analysis tied to the facts of a particular case 
is inadmissible under Daubert).  
21 Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 589, 589–90 (1993)).  
22 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315 (citing 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S 
EVIDENCE ¶ 702[02] (1988)).  
23 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1313–14 (citing a number of articles criticizing the 
25% Rule); id. at 1318 (disapproving of the testimony of Uniloc’s expert, Joseph 
Gemini, who simply took the lowest estimated royalty base of $10, and 
multiplied that number by 25% to arrive at a royalty rate of $2.50 per license 
issued). It is worth noting here that Judge Linn’s opinion described Gemini’s 
final number as the “baseline royalty rate.” Id. As will be revealed in Part III 
infra, I define the Classic 25% Rule as a flexible method for estimating a 
baseline royalty based on credible profitability or cost savings to the licensee. 
Once that baseline royalty is estimated, an expert must still apply the Georgia-
Pacific factors, as well as other factors such as The Book of Wisdom and non-
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This wooden and inflexible methodology meets the definition of Rule of 
Thumb; it should thus, rightly, be inadmissible under Rule 702.  
¶10 This “Rule of Thumb” concept, however, is quite foreign to me; 
it is inconsistent with the methodology I have employed during the past 
fifty years as a negotiator or advisor to parties in commercial 
negotiations, and also as an expert in litigation involving IP. These 
professional exercises require considerable skills, in addition to general 
knowledge about the markets, technologies, and businesses involved. 
Even when one possesses this “general knowledge,” he or she must still 
acquire the requisite specific experience to apply it in the transactional or 
litigation context. For that reason, I have frequently and appropriately 
referred to the discipline of IP licensing as an “art.”  
¶11 That word, “art,” appears in the new title of my business-
oriented publication, which evolved from a previous volume entitled 
Technology Management24 to my present two-volume treatise Licensing 
and the Art of Technology Management.25 Chapter Nine of that treatise is 
designated The Art of Licensing Out.26 Chapter Eleven of the same work, 
written in 2005 and called Royalties and Other Sources of Income from 
Licensing, contains the following statement: “[O]ver the years, the 25% 
Rule has been described as a ‘crude tool’ and a ‘rule of thumb.’ As of 
[2005], I believe it has evolved into a sensitive methodology which has 
become widely accepted in the licensing profession.”27  
¶12 Six years later, as I draft this article, my beliefs remain the 
same—that the Rule is a sensitive methodology, whose widespread 
acceptance has been merited and guaranteed its longevity in the licensing 
profession. In my opinion, it will still, regardless of how courts view the 
admissibility of the Classic 25% Rule in litigation, continue to guide the 
outcome of thousands of IP licensing transactions (not involving 
litigation) throughout the world. However, the Uniloc ruling could 
disrupt the consistency between “hypothetical negotiations” in court and 
actual negotiations as they occur in the real world. This development is 
both dangerous and unnecessary.  
                                                                                                                         
infringing alternatives, discussed infra, to determine the final reasonable royalty. 
Under no circumstances do I suggest that the baseline royalty—as distinguished 
from a “reasonable royalty”—is the end of the analysis in a “hypothetical 
negotiation.” To the contrary, I contend that it is, when applicable, merely the 
starting point.  
24 ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER, TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT (1988). 
25 LICENSING, supra note 13. 
26 See id. ch. 9. 
27 Id. § 11:4, at 11-9. 
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¶13 In view of the potentially drastic impact of the Uniloc decision 
on IP licensing, I consider it important that the decision be limited to 
what has become known as “The Rule of Thumb,” which is the precise 
term used in the opinion, and propose that “the Classic 25% Rule” 
remain a viable methodology for expert witnesses to use when evaluating 
patent royalties in infringement suits. Examples and reasons to adopt this 
view are provided throughout this article.  
II. THE CLASSIC 25% RULE: ITS ORIGINS AND EARLY HISTORY  
¶14 I can pinpoint the exact date and place of my first serious 
exposure to technology licensing: June 1, 1959 in Geneva, Switzerland. 
For the previous two years, I had worked in Geneva as an official of the 
International Labour Organization, a specialized agency of the United 
Nations. I had been persuaded to resign this position and become special 
counsel to two distinguished Swiss law firms, and perhaps to be available 
to others, to help them seize a major opportunity. As a result of a change 
in U.S. tax laws, American companies were no longer required to 
consolidate their earnings from foreign sources. This change in 
accounting practices, combined with the fact that Switzerland would 
agree to the tax-free treatment for a wholly-owned Swiss subsidiary of a 
foreign parent (provided that certain lenient legal conditions were 
satisfied), motivated dozens of American companies to shift their foreign 
licensing operations to Swiss subsidiaries. Because of their regulatory 
climate and cultural features, Geneva and its nearby French-speaking 
communities became the most popular locales from which to conduct 
such global licensing operations. Being of English mother tongue yet 
fluent in French, a recent graduate of a prominent internationally-
oriented law school, and a member of the Bar of the State of New York, I 
was ideally qualified for this practice. Better yet, I was fascinated by the 
nature of the work, which involved exposure to creative people dealing 
with important innovations. I was therefore motivated to become truly 
expert in this specialty and have received professional recognition for the 
achievement of that goal.  
¶15 In light of the recent Uniloc holding and its potential 
ramifications, I have decided, for the first time, to recount in greater 
detail my experiences with Philco. In the past, when I wished to disclose 
more specific information about these transactions with the intention of 
giving color to the Classic 25% Rule story, I felt that I could do so only 
in general terms. But, having outlived both Philco and all of the people 
involved, I am finally able to provide the most complete version of the 
story to date.  
¶16 In 1959, Philco Corporation, with its world headquarters in 
Philadelphia, was a successful, publicly-held company. It manufactured 
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and sold its products in the U.S. and Canada, and through licenses 
elsewhere throughout the world. It produced a variety of consumer and 
electronic products including radio/phonographs, television sets, 
refrigerators, and washing/drying machines. Its Vice President of 
International Marketing, Harvey Williams, was a pioneer in the new 
profession of international technology licensing. He was my much-
appreciated mentor.  
¶17 Philco operated internationally through eighteen arms-length 
licenses. Its principal competitors were General Electric, RCA, and NV 
Philips of the Netherlands. All three were larger than Philco. There were 
also smaller competitors for some of the same products, many of which 
were of excellent quality. Nevertheless, in this highly-competitive 
environment, Philco’s relative position in sales in numerous territories 
was first or second.  
¶18 There were several reasons for the Philco licensees’ success: 
1. Virtually every major product contained some 
valuable patent coverage, although none would be 
rated as pioneer patents. For instance, Philco 
introduced to market the first combination washer-
dryer, the first frostless refrigerator, circuitry on 
electronic products featuring the latest solid state 
designs (which was a very new concept at the time), 
and television sets with fewer control knobs. All of 
its products were dependable, and designed to be 
easily-serviced.  
2. Trade secrets were numerous and well-organized in 
loose-leaf volumes, which were available on a 
strictly-enforced confidential basis and regularly 
updated. At that time, the U.S. Department of 
Defense chose Philco Corporation, because of its 
recognized successes in automating many 
procedures in its own plants, to optimize production 
efficiency in government-operated munitions plants; 
the results of this valuable experience were made 
available to the Philco licensees.  
3. Two other commitments—fulfilled by Philco as 
licensor—were that annual meetings of licensees 
would usually be organized in Philadelphia and 
would be attended by representatives of all the 
licensees. These participants developed friendly 
personal relationships, which promoted mutually-
valuable collaboration among them. An added 
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contribution by Philco was that it had created a team 
of specialized engineers whose members were 
available to fly anywhere in the world on 24-hours 
notice to correct any serious production problems 
that a licensee might encounter. This service entailed 
special charges, but provided a cost-effective 
solution to potentially serious threats to profitability. 
I learned that very few licensors provided such 
personalized service.  
4. Philco maintained a portfolio of housemarks and 
product trademarks that were available to its 
licensees for use with specified products. Philco’s 
public relations department also provided photos, 
drawings, and other copyrighted promotional 
materials designed for use with specific products or 
for publicity across the board. These texts were 
sometimes provided in languages other than English. 
Also, key components, such as customized 
electronic chips and product subassemblies, were 
made available to licensees under favorable terms, if 
requested.  
¶19 The licenses usually had a term of three years, which were 
renewable. All licensees had been carefully selected at the outset and 
their performance was better than satisfactory. They had no conflicts of 
interest with Philco. During the period that I actively advised the Swiss 
licensing subsidiary, excellent personal relations were maintained in the 
“close family,” and the French and Italian licensees were acquired and 
made subsidiaries of the American parent. All in all, this was the 
proverbial win-win situation that provided profits to the parties and 
valuable products to the customers.  
¶20 After spending two years of advising Philco on licensing 
activities, I noticed a pattern between the 5% royalty rate paid by each of 
the licensees and their respective pre-tax profitability rates. Such 
profitability was approximately 20% in each case. My thinking at that 
time was that 5% was a healthy royalty rate, and I was interested to note 
that it usually constituted about 25% of the profitability ultimately 
achieved by the various licensees. I cannot recall referring to this 
phenomenon as anything like “the 25% Rule,” but that moniker 
eventually became the recognized description of the operating results 
that were consistently achieved.  
¶21 As a result of this newly-gained intelligence, I began 
investigating actual or potential profitability of licensing transactions and 
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its influence on the setting of royalty rates. I can also recall other 
licensing programs in different circumstances in which the interaction of 
these factors yielded similar results. One client, a talented Swedish 
inventor, had discovered a novel procedure for cooling ingots in the 
course of steel manufacture. He also invented an early version of the 
twenty- and forty-foot shipping containers that are now ubiquitous for 
the secure transport of virtually all types of industrial products. A 
revenue treatment ratio of 3:1 between the licensee’s and licensor’s 
interests proved to be workable for both of the client’s divisions, despite 
its application to completely unrelated industries.   
¶22 Similar results were observed in the cases of various licensees of 
a British client who had improved a process for the manufacture of 
“blind” rivets and bolts, called “cold heading.” These products were 
valuable in the construction of airplanes, cars, buses, and in the affixing 
of panels to hollow backs where it was not possible to secure the 
fasteners from inside. Because of the special qualities of these products, 
efficiently produced by a patented process, we were able to negotiate a 
royalty rate equivalent to 25% of a rapidly-growing royalty base, to the 
mutual satisfaction of all parties.  
¶23 No standard formulae were in mind at that stage of my career. 
Nevertheless, these experiences helped develop my understanding of the 
relationship between the relevant values of technology and the potential 
commercial results to be achieved by its users. Indeed, the realities to 
which I was exposed during my Philco years became a template for me, 
to which I have continually referred over the years. My empirical 
observations, and those of other professionals with whom I shared my 
impressions, influenced us to move toward the formulation of a 
pragmatic working methodology. This atmosphere persisted for several 
years and our formulations continued to gain credibility because they 
were generating businesslike results. 
III. TYING THE MARKETPLACE TO THE COURTROOM: THE 
INFLUENCE OF THE LANDMARK GEORGIA-PACIFIC CASE  
¶24 It was not until 1970, when the Georgia-Pacific case28 was 
decided, that my experiences in transactional work became tied to the 
litigation context. Georgia-Pacific provided a framework within which 
principles of enlightened licensing negotiations could be applied in the 
course of litigation to determine a “reasonable royalty” under 35 U.S.C. 
                                                      
28 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
2011 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 006 
 
11 
 
§ 284, which is the standard used to determine damages for patent 
infringement.29 
¶25 In particular, the language of the thirteenth of Georgia-Pacific’s 
fifteen factors (Factor Thirteen) articulated the framework that had been 
developing for several years and was appreciated at that time as a 
doctrine. Factor Thirteen instructs trial courts to consider “[t]he portion 
of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, 
business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the 
infringer.”30 This factor is the embodiment of the Classic 25% Rule; it is 
the predominant methodology that I and others have successfully utilized 
for over thirty years. This article seeks to preserve that doctrine. Several 
useful ancillary concepts that facilitate the application of Factor Thirteen 
subsequently developed. They tend to affirm and broaden Factor 
Thirteen’s significance. 
IV. RELATED REALITIES IN THE GEORGIA-PACIFIC ENVIRONMENT 
¶26 Eight years after the Georgia-Pacific decision, Marcus B. 
Finnegan and Herbert H. Mintz published an article of historic 
importance. It was entitled Determination of a Reasonable Royalty in 
Negotiating A License Agreement: Practical Pricing for Successful 
Technology Transfer.31 The article effectively tidied up several details in 
this new area of the law, and while published in 1978, its insights 
continue to be relevant to the subject I am addressing in 2011. 
¶27 Particularly important to the focus of my commentary is a 
section of that article entitled Royalty as a Function of the Next Best 
Alternative to Licensing Available to the Licensee.32 This passage is 
quoted at length because I find it directly on point:  
The maximum royalty [that] would normally be acceptable to a 
Licensee is one that is equal to the cost of the next best available 
alternative. These alternatives are principally: (1) use of the 
technology at the risk of a lawsuit; (2) independent development of 
the same or similar technology; (3) design of the licensee’s 
operations around licensor’s property rights; (4) licensing of 
comparable property rights from another source; or (5) the 
                                                      
29 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
30 Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
31 1 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP. 1, 13–24 (1978). Marc Finnegan, long deceased, 
was the founding partner of the law firm handling the appeals in the Uniloc case 
on behalf of the plaintiff. He was a much appreciated friend of mine with whom 
I co-founded and co-edited the early volumes of The Law & Business of 
Licensing – The Best of LES Nouvelles. 
32 Id. at 16–17. 
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avoidance of any use of technology within the purview of the 
licensor’s property rights. 
Clearly a determination of these alternatives provides the licensee 
with a good indication of the strength and the practical value of the 
intellectual property to be licensed.  If the licensee finds that several 
viable alternatives are available at relatively low cost, he will 
consider the intellectual property to be of limited worth and will not 
offer a high royalty. In contrast, if the intellectual property 
constitutes strong patent rights or know-how covering an important 
field, the licensee may find that a profitable market is accessible 
only through licensing. In such circumstances, he should be willing 
to pay a higher royalty.  
Reliable estimates of the real value of the alternatives to the licensee 
are often difficult for either the licensor or licensee to determine. 
However, an effort to make reasonable estimates can be a rewarding 
exercise since a reasonable royalty arrived at through this method 
will provide the highest figure [that] the licensee should be willing 
to accept.33 
¶28 In addition to (1) the empirically-suggested initial baseline of 
25:75 and (2) Georgia-Pacific Factor Thirteen, I consider this axiom 
about the next best alternative to be the third basic element in the Classic 
25% Rule.  
¶29 There is a fourth concept that has become valuable to the 
jurisprudence relating to damages in IP litigation; it is known as “The 
Book of Wisdom.” This concept was first cited by Judge Howard 
Markey, the first Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, in his Fromson opinion.34 Early in Fromson, Judge Markey 
emphasized that an expert who has been retained to comment on the 
issue of patent infringement damages should focus on the consequences 
of infringement by answering the following questions: 
• Is the quality of the invention, as patented, such that 
it is technically very difficult or economically very 
expensive for a third party to design around, or 
otherwise avoid? 
• Are purchasers of the product or users of the process 
of which the patented invention forms a part, aware 
of the presence of the impact of the invention, and is 
                                                      
33 Id. 
34 Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
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this awareness crucial to the decision to purchase or 
use? 
• Is the impact of the invention such that it influences 
the sale of other components, assembled products 
and subassemblies, directly related to the invention, 
as well as other products such that the concepts of 
‘the entire market value rule’ or ‘collateral’ or 
‘convoyed’ sales should be taken into account?35 
¶30 My prior writings on this language by Judge Markey reflect my 
own disdain for the use of a “Rule of Thumb.” I stated that 
[t]his type of qualitative analysis of the patented invention is basic 
to the task of an expert in reaching an opinion whether the 
consequential level of damages from the infringements should 
logically be great or small. This is the sort of reasoning in which 
appropriate experience and skills are really pertinent to a court in 
assessing damages, rather than the mechanical application of 
various procedural approaches that may previously have been 
employed in other cases.36 
¶31 In the Fromson opinion, Judge Markey quoted the following 
language from Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Sinclair v. Jenkins: 
At times the only evidence available may be that supplied by 
testimony of experts as to the state of the art, the character of the 
improvement, and the probable increase of efficiency or savings of 
expense. . . . This will generally be the case if the trial follows 
quickly after the issue of the patent. But a different situation is 
presented if years have gone by before the evidence is offered. 
Experience is then available to correct uncertain prophesy. Here is a 
book of wisdom that courts may not neglect. We find no rule of law 
that sets a clasp upon its pages, and forbids us to look within.37 
¶32 I expect that The Book of Wisdom may be a significant factor in 
determining damages to be paid by Microsoft in its new trial on damages 
for the infringement of the ’216 patent. The Book of Wisdom should 
replace the faulty methodology employed by the damages expert retained 
by Uniloc, who used a version of the discredited Rule of Thumb. 
Uniloc’s damages expert also did not appropriately apply the Georgia-
Pacific factors, wrongly attempted to inflate the royalty base by misuse 
of the entire market value rule, and was rightly criticized by Judge Linn. 
It seems to me that there is considerable relevant information about the 
                                                      
35 LICENSING, supra note 13, § 18:2, at 18-5. 
36 Id. at 18-6 (emphasis added).  
37 Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1575 (quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins 
Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698 (1933)). 
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respective contributions of the parties that can clarify, in the new trial on 
damages, the level of royalties that would be “reasonable” in these 
particular circumstances. 
V. THE ESSENCE OF THE CLASSIC 25% RULE 
A. The Classic 25% Rule is Not a Rule of Thumb 
¶33 As I understand The Rule of Thumb, as considered by Judge 
Linn in Uniloc, the parties assume that the licensor is entitled to 25% of 
the defined profitability pie of a particular technology transfer, with the 
licensee automatically receiving the remaining 75% of the pie.  
According to The Rule of Thumb, this division is made at the outset of 
discussions, with no further analysis. This inflexible selection, the so-
called “25% Rule of Thumb,” is what I believe the Federal Circuit 
considered to be “a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline 
royalty rate.”38 As I have already indicated, I agree with Judge Linn’s 
opinion on this point, because such rigidity is a crude, inappropriate 
shortcut, avoiding what should be a skilled and detailed analysis.39  
B. The Flexibility of the Classic 25% Rule 
¶34 From the foregoing observation, the contrast between The Rule 
of Thumb and the Classic 25% Rule becomes clear, although both have 
the intent to fix patent infringement damages by dividing revenues in a 
hypothetical negotiation. Under the Classic 25% Rule, a dividing ratio is 
tentatively chosen at the outset of the hypothetical negotiation—one that 
is possibly, but not necessarily, equal to 25:75, depending on the prior 
experience of the parties or their initial impressions at the outset of the 
exercise. This is nevertheless a matter that should be considered further 
in each case, taking into account the specific conditions affecting the 
respective parties in the relevant market. These days, the tentative 
baseline remains subject to revision by experts in accordance with the 
Georgia-Pacific factors and other available sources of information in 
order to arrive at a reasonable royalty. Such available sources of 
information include possible non-infringing alternatives, the Book of 
Wisdom, statistical collections of licensing terms by industry, and 
precedents of well-accepted judicial opinions. This analytical framework 
reflects my understanding of the Classic 25% Rule, which I have 
“practiced while I preached.” To contend that I have maintained that 
every hypothetical negotiation should begin at 25:75 and remain fixed is 
incorrect and misleading. These assignments should be customized 
bodies of work; they always require tailoring. 
                                                      
38 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
39 The same criticism applies in the marketplace as well as in the courtroom.  
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¶35 My “basic tool kit” consisting of the Classic 25% Rule and its 
ancillary concepts has also proven to be effective in analyzing and 
suggesting acceptable solutions in an impressive range of commercial as 
well as judicial situations. A selection of these scenarios is described in 
Subsection D infra to demonstrate that this sophisticated methodology—
which should be considered as the antithesis to any Rule of Thumb—is 
worthy of being retained in the good graces of the law.   
¶36 It will be noted infra that I decided on several occasions to use a 
baseline ratio as a function of incremental (sometimes referred to as 
“marginal”) operating profits, other than 25:75. This was because my 
prima facie impression was that the relative contributions of the parties 
justified a different tentative ratio.  Such initial baselines (from 15:85 up 
to 80:20) were still open to further modifications, taking into account the 
other prongs of analysis, namely interpretation of the pertinent Georgia-
Pacific factors, non-infringing alternatives and the Book of Wisdom. 
¶37 By shifting the initial baseline closer to the final ratio decision, 
the second “tuning” process is made easier and the results are more 
sensitive. In the future, I intend to be even more alert to the 
implementation of the primary baseline selection, because this could 
increase accuracy in the final results, and perhaps even promote more 
settlements between litigating parties. 
C. Properly Valuing IP Using The Classic 25% Rule 
¶38 As a result of legislation, administrative action, and greater 
accessibility to the marketplace by internet-powered technologies, it has 
become increasingly important for companies to understand the value of 
their technologies. Procedures have developed to conduct appraisals of 
these assets for numerous applications. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,40 
enacted by Congress in 2002, has greatly accelerated this development. 
Thus, in addition to management’s interest in understanding the technical 
significance of its IP portfolio, serious attention is also being given to IP 
financial valuations as a matter of both law and business.  
¶39 There are three basic methodologies that have been traditionally 
used when valuing IP: the income, market, and cost approaches. The 
Classic 25% Rule falls within the scope of the income approach. The 
market approach attempts to locate similar situations that could have 
precedential value. The cost approach describes the expense to replace 
the existing asset should it be damaged or destroyed. Although I typically 
utilize the income approach, I usually attempt to verify my valuation by 
referencing one or both of the other approaches to ensure that my final 
result will be accepted as reasonable. 
                                                      
40 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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¶40 Regardless of which approach is chosen, the relevant issues 
remain the same when appraising the monetary value of IP. IP valuation 
has many well-known elements and criteria, including sound market 
research, analyses of the significance and enforceability of the patents, 
reasoned forecasts of growth and profitability, sophisticated employment 
of spreadsheets, and other intangibles. A specific technique that has 
proven to be effective is often referred to as the Royalty/Relief from 
Royalty approach,41 which attempts to answer the following question: 
What would the proprietor itself reasonably pay for its intangibles being 
measured at this time and under present circumstances? It is assumed 
that the proprietor does not own its own rights, but wishes to acquire an 
exclusive, paid-up, worldwide license to such rights, and has the 
resources to make such an acquisition. There is a further assumption, 
almost always confirmed, that no one is as familiar with the strengths 
and weaknesses of the property being evaluated—and the outside factors 
affecting its value—than the proprietor itself.  
D. Several Pertinent Projects Undertaken and Completed 
¶41 Against this background, consider the following projects in 
which my firm and I personally have been involved: 
1. Merck & Co. – Non-medical inventions 
¶42 Merck, a leading pharmaceutical company, internally solved 
three pollution problems it faced as a result of its manufacturing and 
research operations.  One invention addressed the issue of unacceptable 
air emissions; another dealt with hazardous water conditions (the same 
problem dramatized in the film, Erin Brockovich42); and the third 
responded to soil contamination.  These were truly impressive innovative 
projects. Equally impressive was the formidable patent protection 
obtained by Merck on these innovations. 
¶43 The Company considered three possible strategies: 
• Set up a new company to exploit the technologies 
through service contracts for sales of specialty 
equipment plus sales of specialty chemicals and 
equipment. This entity could be a wholly-owned 
subsidiary or a joint venture with a qualified 
engineering contractor. 
                                                      
41 See THE LESI GUIDE TO LICENSING BEST PRACTICES: STRATEGIC ISSUES AND 
CONTEMPORARY REALITIES (Robert Goldscheider ed., Wiley 1st ed. 2002). 
42 ERIN BROCKOVICH (Jersey Films 2000). 
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• License the technologies to third parties by an 
internal team to be organized by the company, 
perhaps with the collaboration of consultants. 
• Donate the technologies to the United Nations, the 
Environmental Protection Agency and/or equivalent 
foreign government agencies, or other non-profit 
entities, and take tax deductions. 
¶44 Before deciding the course of action, Merck proceeded to have 
the three technologies appraised. I was approached to perform what our 
firm called a Dynamic Technology Audit for each technology—an 
appraisal employing the Classic 25% Rule together with the 
Royalty/Relief from Royalty approach. We performed three DTAs, and 
the client made its key researchers and executives, patenting records, and 
market research available to my team. The results of the appraisals 
confirmed that every one of these technologies was extremely valuable. 
¶45 The company then considered its alternatives. It reasoned that all 
of the strategies would draw resources away from its core business, 
which was the discovery, licensing, and development of new drugs. The 
decision was therefore made to donate the technologies to qualified 
government agencies. I agreed because I appreciated the large capital 
investments required to establish these pollution control activities as 
profit centers. The donation route provided a significant balance sheet 
benefit without disturbing the company’s basic mission. 
2. Dow Chemical and W.R. Grace 
¶46 A dramatic and successful employment of the Classic 25% Rule 
occurred in the early 1990s in the course of negotiations between two 
major petrochemical companies, Dow Chemical Company and W.R. 
Grace. Dow was a leading manufacturer of polyethylene, with annual 
sales exceeding $1 billion. Its process (P-1) required the purchase from 
Grace of an intermediate compound (Y) in annual orders of over $400 
million. Dow owned a patent on P-1, which would expire in seven years.  
It decided to switch all of its future production of polyethylene to P-2, a 
new production technology developed by Dow’s research teams. This 
switch was made primarily for cost reasons, but also because P-2 was 
more flexible than P-1 in producing different grades of polyethylene.  
¶47 P-2 did not require Grace’s Y in the production of polyethylene. 
Rather than simply abandoning P-1, however, Dow decided to offer 
Grace the opportunity to become the exclusive worldwide licensee of P-
1. Such a license was cost-effective to Grace because, as a basic producer 
of Y, Grace could—using the P-1 process—profitably manufacture 
polyethylene. Another attraction of such a license was that it could 
compensate Grace for lost sales of Y to Dow.  
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¶48 Grace was interested in taking such a license to P-1 and offered 
to pay a seemingly reasonable 5% running royalty on its sales of 
polyethylene manufactured by the P-1 process. Dow, with my advice, 
tested the reasonableness of this offer by applying the Classic 25% Rule, 
which involved the analysis of data Dow had recorded when using its P-1 
technology. Dow also understood the market for polyethylene, past and 
present, and had realistic projections for the future. 
¶49 Dow conducted such a study because it intended to remain in the 
market for polyethylene, utilizing P-2. Dow was also able to calculate 
pro forma profitability to Grace by subtracting Grace’s price and margin 
on its prior sales of Y to Dow for use in P-1. This analysis revealed that 
Grace should be able to operate as a licensee under Dow’s P-1 patent at 
an operating profit of 44%. Dow shared its fully-documented analysis 
with Grace and asked Grace to “please tell us if we are wrong.” If not, 
Dow expected to receive an 11% royalty based on Grace’s sales of 
polyethylene using Dow’s patented P-1 process, calculated as a 25% 
piece of the known profitability pie, rather than the 5% that was offered. 
Following study of Dow’s work product, Grace (somewhat surprised) 
agreed with Dow’s conclusion, and accepted Dow’s terms because they 
would still make a 33% operating profit under the license, which was 
higher than Grace’s normal corporate operating profit rate. Over the 
remaining life of its P-1 patent, this additional 6% royalty amounted to 
an added profit of several hundred million dollars to Dow. 
¶50 This transaction highlights several benefits of using the Classic 
25% Rule: 
• It showcases how the Rule adequately represents the 
relative bargaining position of the parties. In this 
transaction, Dow had the advantage of 20/20 
hindsight because of its comprehensive knowledge 
of the market for polyethylene. By comparing its 
knowledge of the costs of production and expected 
profitability of possible continued use of P-1, it 
could simply pull Grace’s financials from its SEC 
filings and determine whether Grace would be able 
and willing to pay more than the 5% royalty it was 
offering. This makes the Rule particularly useful in 
the litigation context, where discovery and access to 
experts all but guarantees the advantages of 
hindsight and accurate projections. 
• Successful application of the Classic 25% Rule adds 
value to both parties. Without P-1, Grace would 
have been squeezed out of the market for 
2011 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 006 
 
19 
 
polyethylene; also, the value of its intermediate 
polymer, Y, would have been greatly reduced 
because Dow was the primary purchaser of it. 
Without Dow as a purchaser, Grace needed a license 
to P-1 in order to produce polyethylene, and thus, 
get full benefit from its production of Y. This 
successful employment of the Classic 25% Rule 
resulted in (1) Dow making more profit than it 
would have if it just accepted Grace’s offer of 5% 
without further investigation; (2) a financially-
advantageous transaction for Grace, whose profits 
on the production of polyethylene still remained 
higher than its overall company operating margins; 
and (3) a lifeline thrown to Grace, which would have 
lost hundreds of millions of dollars of sales of Y had 
it not agreed to the transaction. This is the 
quintessential win-win, which is the textbook goal of 
every commercial transaction and which provides 
convincing evidence of the practical effectiveness of 
the Classic 25% Rule. This result could never have 
been achieved if the parties had merely attempted to 
employ a 25% Rule of Thumb.  
3. Other Examples 
¶51 In my research for this article, I examined my files on several 
other matters, the factual details of which are less significant than their 
providing evidence of the wide variety of activities in which the Classic 
25% Rule operated effectively. I have therefore decided to refer merely 
to the subject matter of these projects to demonstrate my point. I selected 
seven that, respectively, involved (i) an auction for the licensing of 
patented specialty syringes attended by several competitors; (ii) advice to 
a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur about the likelihood of success of 
an investment in a new technology; (iii) suggesting a logical lump sum 
settlement of a patent infringement case; (iv) settlement of an estate tax 
problem following the death of the inventor of a popular copyrighted 
game; his trademark was also involved; (v) predicting the value at 
auction of a small portfolio of new patents for the benefit of the bank, 
which was the lead creditor of the patentee/bankrupt party; (vi) 
suggesting the sale price of a water company that had the attractive and 
accurate name, and registered trademark, “Appalachian Spring”; and 
(vii) appraising the comparative values of two $150 million divisions that 
a major French company, for strategic reasons, wanted to swap with its 
U.S. subsidiary, so that a concern about horrible tax problems was 
removed when the U.S. Internal Revenue Service accepted our 
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conclusion that the technologies being considered for the change were of 
equivalent value. 
VI. A SUCCESSFUL EMPLOYMENT OF THE CLASSIC 25% RULE IN 
MAJOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION: HUGHES  
AIRCRAFT CO. V. UNITED STATES 
¶52 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States43 was the largest litigation 
in my career, in which I appeared as an expert witness. I understand it is 
still regarded as an important case in U.S. patent infringement litigation. 
It occupied the majority of my professional time during the 1988 
calendar year and provided me with the greatest challenge and the most 
genuine satisfaction I have experienced in the numerous expert witness 
assignments I have undertaken in more than thirty-five years. 
¶53 Briefly, this was a portion of the case dealing with damages that 
the U.S. government would be required to pay to Hughes based on the 
already-decided infringement of the so-called Williams Patent.44 This 
invention governed a maneuver called “precession,” which plays a role 
in enabling a satellite to achieve a geosynchronous orbit. This means that 
such satellite, once it reaches its desired position in space, would 
essentially remain in the same location when observed from a point on 
Earth. This is desirable in some cases because it permits the satellite to 
be continuously observed and controlled by ground-based operators and 
equipment. 
¶54 My testimony on direct and cross-examination is contained in 
781 pages of transcript.45 This testimony included accounts of the 
following: 
                                                      
43 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 267 (Cl. Ct. 1988); see 
also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 550 (Cl. Ct. 1988). 
44 Velocity Control and Orientation of a Spin-Stabilized Body, U.S. Patent No. 
3,758,051 (filed Aug. 21, 1964). 
45 Transcript of Testimony of Robert Goldscheider, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 
United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 267 (1988) (No. 426-73). I obtained a copy of the 
transcript of my testimony, in three volumes, through the courtesy of the U.S. 
Department of Justice. My views about the calculation of reasonable royalties 
under 35 U.S.C. § 1498 were explored in detail by counsel for both sides. This 
testimony provides a record of the high quality and considerable quantity of 
work that went into the formulation of my testimony. I will be glad to furnish 
interested persons with a copy of the complete transcript, at the cost of 
reproduction and shipment. Such persons should contact Ken Schoppmann, 
Director of the Licensing Executives Society (U.S.A. & Canada) Inc., 1800 
Diagonal Road, Arlington, VA 22314-2840, who will forward requests to me. 
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• My extensive preparations, including visits to five 
different U.S. government space-related facilities, on 
both the East and West coasts; 
• Acquiring sufficient understanding of the 
significance of the Williams Patent to be able to 
appreciate and formulate effective strategies that 
were appropriate in the face of claims advanced on 
Hughes’s behalf; 
• Studying the testimony of the two eminent licensing 
executives who had been selected by Hughes to 
provide opinions on damages resulting from the 
infringement of the Williams Patent by the United 
States. Each of these experts concluded that a 15% 
royalty rate based on the cost of each satellite in 
which infringement occurred would be “reasonable” 
under §1498. That conclusion would result in the 
United States owing damages to Hughes worth 
several billion dollars; 
• Learning to appreciate the special contributions of 
the U.S. government through the creation of the 
space program and the market for products and 
technologies to be employed therewith; 
• Analyzing each accused satellite and developing a 
methodology to understand the relative importance 
of the Williams Patent to the execution of the 
missions in which it operated; and 
• Reducing the baseline ratio from 25:75 to 15:85. 
¶55 My opinion, even at the end of my testimony, was that the 
reasonable royalty rate payable by the United States to Hughes for the 
infringement of the Williams Patent was 1% of the cost of each launched 
satellite that employed the Williams Patent, prior to supplementary 
statutory payments for delay. Judge James Turner agreed and held that 
the reasonable royalty rate was 1%.46 His decision was appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit where it was unanimously 
affirmed.47  
                                                      
46 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 481, 491 (Fed. Cl. 1994) 
(concluding “that a reasonable royalty rate to be applied to total spacecraft cost 
for the government’s use of the Williams invention is one percent”). 
47 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
Hughes’ unsuccessful appeal was argued by Kenneth Starr, Esq. 
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¶56 Prior to writing this article, I reread the entire transcript of my 
testimony in the Hughes case. I also compared my work in 1988 with the 
Federal Circuit’s reasoning in the 2011 Uniloc case. Naturally, I focused 
on the court’s negative reaction to the “25% Rule of Thumb.” When 
reading my testimony in the Hughes case, I was very gratified to note 
that it perfectly conformed to my description of “The Classic 25% Rule” 
in this article. I therefore hope that the district court, which will shortly 
hear the remanded case on damages in Uniloc, will be made aware of this 
similarity, limit the inadmissibility commanded by Uniloc to the 
correctly maligned “Rule of Thumb,” and thus refrain from throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater. 
CONCLUSION 
¶57 I have appreciated this opportunity to review and comment about 
the Rule that has played an important part in my career and which has 
been widely considered and frequently used effectively in the dynamic 
licensing profession. It is my desire that this analysis will enable the 
Classic 25% Rule to survive the Federal Circuit’s opinion and assuage 
the concerns of its critics. As a loyal member of The Licensing 
Executives Society, who has been proud to receive its Gold Medal, I 
hope these thoughts will prove helpful to my peers as they pursue their 
careers around the world.  
¶58 I would like to conclude with one final point. One of the most 
impressive clients with whom I have had the privilege to work over the 
years is The Coca-Cola Company. Several years ago, their senior 
management presided over an unfortunate decision to alter the formula of 
their lead product. This led to a storm of criticism, and the company 
promptly returned to its traditional course and brought back its storied 
beverage, with the addition of the title “Classic.” By using the same 
description for the weathered 25% Rule, I hope to restore it to a widely-
respected role in the world of licensing and technology management. 
